To what extent do women's organizations share a common commitment to organizational participatory democracy? Research suggests that women appear more likely than men to prefer democratic decision-making processes, yet these studies generally compare women's and men's behavior in organizations that are not only numerically dominated by men but that were also initially formed by men. I examine the electoral and policymaking rules of 37 membership-based women's associations in order to determine the extent to which the bylaws of women's groups exhibit the high levels of democracy predicted by the theoretical and empirical literature. I find that levels of democracy in women's associations vary more than research on women's governance would suggest. I then explore factors that influence the observed variation in women's groups. I find that the extent to which a women's group relies on membership dues, the year it was founded, and, to a lesser extent, its size affect how democratically it is structured. I conclude by considering the implications of these findings for the representation of women's diverse political and economic interests. S cholars have found that women's presence in traditionally maledominated institutions makes a difference in how those institutions reach decisions. Women's leadership style, for example, has been found to differ from men's: Women appear more likely than men to seek consensus and solicit input from others, and are generally more likely to I gratefully acknowledge research assistance provided by Anna Olsson and the helpful comments of Brian Schaffner.
S cholars have found that women's presence in traditionally maledominated institutions makes a difference in how those institutions reach decisions. Women's leadership style, for example, has been found to differ from men's: Women appear more likely than men to seek consensus and solicit input from others, and are generally more likely to encourage participation (Gilligan 1982; Stivers 2002 )-yet these studies generally compare women's and men's behavior in organizations that are not only numerically dominated by men but that were also initially formed by men. As important as it is to understand how women behave in existing institutions, this approach may also obscure aspects of women's organizational behavior. This study asks: Do the governing structures of organizations that women created and that women dominate reflect a common commitment to democratic styles of organizational leadership?
Several strands of theoretical and empirical literature examining diverse organizational forms (including feminist, workplace, and legislative entities) hold that women are bridge builders, seeking to include others in decision making (Bowling, Kelleher, and Wright 2005; Ferree and Martin 1995; Harvey 1985; Kathlene 1994; Knoke 1990; Loden 1985; McClelland 1975; Rosener 1990; Rosenthal 1998; Schechter 1982) . Theoretically, the decision-making processes of organizations formed primarily by women and led predominately by women should reflect their predisposition toward democratic forms of governance. If the governance structures of women's organizations are relatively democratic, the characterization of women's styles of governing as cooperative, consensus oriented, and empowerment focused is supported. When I examine the electoral and policymaking rules of 37 membership-based women's associations in order to determine whether the bylaws of women's groups exhibit consistently high levels of democracy, however, I find that levels of democracy in women's associations vary more than research on women's governance would suggest. Given this variance, I then examine the factors that explain the differing levels of democratic practices found among women's organizations.
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS
Several streams of scholarship suggest that women's distinctive leadership styles promote participation and democratic practices within organizations. While some scholars argue that biological differences between men and women are reflected in their organizational behavior (see, for example, Gilligan 1982; Money and Erhardt 1972) , the preponderance suggest that men's and women's gendered life experiences explain such variation.
Irrespective of how they explain the origin of gender differences, a substantial literature in a variety of fields, including psychology, business administration, sociology, and political science, finds that women are more likely than men to encourage cooperative behavior, are more concerned with achieving consensus, and are more likely to seek out others' opinions than men. As leaders in organizations, women encourage participation. Studies of female corporate managers suggest that they tend to delegate authority more broadly than men (Bass 1990; Gilligan 1982; Rosener 1990 ). Female administrators "devote more time on both developing policy and garnering public support," for example (Bowling, Kelleher, and Wright 2005) . Women tend to draw others into deliberative processes and encourage individuals to contribute their unique perspectives (Rosener 1990) .
In studies that theorize the existence of distinctive leadership styles based on how democratically or autocratically an individual wields his or her authority, women have been found to favor democratic approaches. In a meta-analysis of 162 studies of sex differences in leadership styles across various domains, Alice Eagly and Blair Johnson (1990, 240) found that "the largest overall sex difference was obtained for the democratic versus autocratic comparisons," with women preferring the former (see also Rosener 1990 and Shakescraft 1987) .
In legislatures, for example, female committee chairs are less likely to dominate proceedings and more likely to foster discussion among participants (Kathlene 1994) . In her analysis of state legislative committee chairs, Cindy Simon Rosenthal (1998) argues that women legislators take an "integrative" approach to lawmaking-one that contrasts with the masculine ("transactional") approach. Integrative leadership "stresses empowerment of others, a feminist conceptualization of power as support and cooperation rather than dominance" (1998, 21) . Rosenthal found chairwomen in state legislatures to be task oriented and assertive, as chairmen tend to be, but that their personalities were also more process and team oriented than were those of their male peers (p. 64). She notes, "In sum, women committee chairs are more likely to emphasize participation, shared power, and collaborative problem solving through direct discussion" (p. 71).
Research suggesting that women leaders evince more participatory behaviors and prefer more democratic governance processes is commonly based on organizations with both male and female participants. Women leaders tend to comprise a minority of all leaders in the organizations studied. As a result, findings of sex differences in leadership behavior may not reflect women's true tendencies or preferences. Rosabeth Kanter (1977) argued that asymmetries in male and female behavior in corporations can be attributed to where women and men are usually situated in corporate hierarchies (in which men tend to occupy dominant and women often occupy subordinate positions)-not because the sexes inherently prefer different modes of social interaction or decision making (see also Epstein and Straub 1991) . In addition to reflecting structural inequalities, leadership behavior is likely to be influenced by social norms and expectations (Eagly and Johnson 2002; Gardiner and Tiggemann 1999) . If women tend to seek out consensus and distribute authority in organizations, this may be because women must (or they feel they must) downplay their autonomy and power in order to satisfy the gendered views of acceptable conduct held by either those above them in the hierarchy and/or by their subordinates (see, for example, comments by female state legislative committee members in Rosenthal 1998, 111-12; see also O'Reilly and O'Neill 2004) .
To understand whether women value democratic structures more than men do, then, it is useful to examine the types of institutions they formulate in their own organizations. Rules and structures of organizations tend to reflect the values and goals of their creators (Knoke 1990; Stinchcombe 1968) . For example, in her discussion of the founding of the National Council of Jewish Women, Faith Rogow found that "practical concerns and the insistence on equal access to power for all members" were important considerations for leaders during the formulation of the organization's bylaws (1993, 29) . As a result, "council rules consistently reflected the desire to share power fairly among all members" (p. 30). While one of the most prominent examples of secondwave feminist organizations, the National Organization for Women (NOW), did not initially focus on involving rank-and-file members in the governance process, by the end of its founding period (1966-71) the organization had institutionalized a highly representative and participatory structure (Barakso 2004; Carden 1974; Ferguson 1984) . While these examples are suggestive, it is not clear whether they represent widespread patterns in the formation of women's organizations. Therefore, an examination of the rules of women's organizations will provide important insight into how consistent their governing styles are.
In the following section, I analyze the governance structures of 37 women's organizations to determine the extent to which women's groups exhibit a uniformly democratic approach to decision making. After demonstrating substantial variance in their governing structures, I then examine the factors that explain why this is the case.
EXAMINATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL BYLAWS
To study organizational democracy I collected bylaws from a purposive sample of women's associations. I began by creating a list of all noninstitutional membership-based women's organizations based on a list of organizations that were members of the National Council of Women's Organizations. 1 Because of the potential limitations with relying on only this source, I supplemented this list with membership organizations appearing in a database of 501(c) organizations provided by the National Council for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). I searched the NCCS data for all national organizations that included a reference to women in their names. While these methods identified more than 80 organizations that fit the criteria for this study, I was unable to acquire bylaws from many of them. Therefore, the final sample included 37 bylaws obtained via organizations' Websites, through direct requests from organizations, or through Internal Revenue Service Form 990. 2 Excluded were those women's organizations that were not categorized as women's groups, that did not have individuals as members, or for which I was not able to obtain their bylaws. 3 While my sample of women's organizations is nonrandom, the organizations do vary widely on factors such as age, size, and organization type (see the Appendix). Of the 37 organizations, 11 originated before 1960 and 26 formed later. The oldest group in the sample is the American Association of University Women, which was founded in 1881. On the other hand, Women in Technology is more than a century younger, having been founded in 1994. Membership size also ranged widely, from 300 members in Executive Women in Government to 500,000 in the National Organization for Women. Finally, there was also considerable variation in the types of groups sampled-eight of the organizations were classified as 1. Noninstitutional membership-based organizations are defined as organizations that have members who are individuals rather than other organizations (such as other interest groups, corporations, etc.). If an organization had both organizational and individual members, then it was not excluded.
2. The Internal Revenue Service requires nonprofits to submit bylaws with this annual tax form if the organization has amended them. Many 990s for both 501c3s and, to a lesser extent, 501c4s, may be found on the Website http://guidestar.org.
3. Organizations whose bylaws were unobtainable may theoretically be less democratic than others. Nevertheless, the analysis of the final sample is sufficiently varied that concerns about potential bias are reduced.
multi-issue and political groups, five were ethnic organizations, and 24 were occupationally based.
The bylaws collected for these organizations represent those in use during 2005. Of course, bylaws can be amended or rewritten. However, institutions tend to be "sticky" and remain stable over time (North 1990; North and Thomas 1973; Pierson 2000; Przeworski 1991) . Institutions are especially unlikely to change when they are created endogenously, rather than imposed from an exogenous actor (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2005) . In addition, over half of the organizations in my sample require a supermajority of members to ratify a change in the bylaws, making their governing structures particularly unmalleable. Nevertheless, even if the organizations' bylaws have been altered over time, these changes would have been initiated and ratified by women. Therefore, these institutions, even if amended, should continue to reflect the goals and values of the women who amended them.
Bylaws provide information about each group's representational structure. I coded bylaws for the influence that members wield in each organization's electoral process, on organization policy, and on the number of levels in the organization (for example, local, state, regional and national): † Electoral Process-Role of members in selecting group leadership. -Is the board or the annual convention of members the ultimate authority on group policy? † Organizational Influence-Degree to which members can affect organizational structure.
-Is a vote of membership required to amend bylaws? If so, is a majority or supermajority required? † Organizational Levels-Degree of centralization.
-Do the bylaws provide for multiple organizational levels (i.e., regional, state, or local chapters)? Table 1 presents a summary of the distribution of groups along these measures. A fundamental avenue for member representation and participation, the ability to vote for the groups' leaders is offered by the majority of organizations in the sample (though many impose some restrictions on members' ability to do so). However, there was still substantial variance even on this benchmark. More than three-fourths of the organizations grant members the right to vote for the board of directors without restrictions. The bylaws for the National Federation of Press Women state that "active members may vote; propose, second and vote on motions; and serve in elected office." The bylaws of the League of Women Voters state that "citizens at least 18 years of age who join the League shall be voting members of local Leagues, state Leagues and of the LWVUS," thereby guaranteeing its members the right to vote in elections at every level of the organization. Table 1 also notes organizations that allow members to vote for the directors or officers but under some restrictions. This refers to groups that have some board members who are elected by members and others who are not. For example, the League of Women Voters allows members to vote for eight members of the board of directors, but up to eight additional directors can be appointed by members of the board. On the other hand, a small number of groups do not allow their members to vote for any offices. Women in Government's bylaws explicitly state that "members shall have no voting rights." In this organization, the board of directors is responsible for nominating and electing new members to the board, leaving rank-and-file members entirely out of the process.
The right to nominate board members and officers is even less consistent among these groups. Over half of the organizations do not allow members any guaranteed voice in which candidates appear on the ballot for officer positions, and 46% prevent member nominations for board elections. In most cases, the bylaws for these organizations establish nominating committees that may solicit names from the membership, but it is at the committee's discretion as to whether these suggested candidates will actually be nominated. Several groups also restrict the ability of members to nominate candidates. For example, the Association for Women in Mathematics requires a petition signed by 20 members in order to nominate a candidate for office, while the National Federation of Press Women requires a 10-member petition to nominate. In Business and Professional Women, additional nominations may come from state organizations, but not from individual members. Thus, while members of women's groups can generally elect the leaders of those groups, there is less consistency in whether they will have any say in who the candidates will be.
In addition to the basic voting and nomination rights extended to members, the influence that members enjoy within organizations is also a function of whether they possess the right to amend their groups' primary governing documents, and the extent to which the final authority in matters of policy rests with members rather than with leaders. More than three-fourths of organizations allow members to vote on amendments to their bylaws; however two-thirds of those groups require a supermajority to ratify them. Several organizations do not, however, involve the membership in amending bylaws at all. For example, the National Association of Women's Business Owners provides for the amendment of bylaws by a majority vote of the board of directors; members can neither propose nor vote on such amendments.
An important factor in interest group governance is whether final governing authority rests with a group's members or the board of directors. Yet less than one-fourth of the groups provide members with full final authority on policy at the group's convention. The most democratic organizations in this sample all give members the final authority over organization policy. NOW's bylaws clearly state that "the national conference shall be the supreme governing body of NOW." Likewise, the bylaws of the International Women's Insolvency and Restructuring Confederation (IWIRC) state that "individual members . . . shall have ultimate authority over the affairs of the confederation," and those of the National Federation of Press Women declare that "the Governing Body of the organization shall be the annually assembled membership." While the boards of directors for these organizations may manage the day-to-day affairs of the organization, the governing documents ensure that ultimate authority rests with the members.
Five organizations have bylaws that institutionalize power sharing between the membership and the board. For example, the National Federation of Republican Women's bylaws state that the board acts "as the governing body of the NFRW between biennial conventions." Overall, however, in 23 of the 37 groups, nearly two-thirds of the sample, the final authority on organizational policy rests solely with the board of directors. For instance, the bylaws of the Organization of Chinese American Women give the board of directors "all such powers as may be exercised by the organization." Likewise, the governing document of the Association of Women in the Metal Industries states that "the activities and affairs of the International Association shall be exercised by or under the ultimate direction of the International Board of Directors." Federated groups, comprising multiple levels of governance, allow members numerous points of contact and opportunities for influence. On the other hand, organizations with no affiliates or local chapters offer members only one avenue through which they may voice their preferences. Women's organizations in this sample vary greatly in terms of their structure. Most groups include subnational affiliates-only seven groups of 37 were structured on a solely national basis. Of those with subnational affiliates, 29.7% had two levels, 24.3% had three, and 27.0% had four levels in their organizations. Thus, over half of the women's organizations had at least three organizational levels, providing members with numerous points of contact with the groups. It is also important to note that organizations with state and local chapters often provided specific guidelines for how those organizations should be governed. For example, NOW's national bylaws state that "a chapter shall . . . formulate bylaws consistent with these bylaws . . . and elect its officers." The bylaws go on to ensure that "membership in a chapter and voting privileges in the election of chapter officers shall be open to all NOW members." Other organizations include similar statements in their bylaws, and many even provide state and local chapters with templates for creating their own governing documents.
In sum, women's organizations vary substantially in terms of how they structure themselves. Although most groups allow members to vote for their board of directors and on proposed changes to the bylaws, for example, not all do so. Women's organizations also vary a great deal on other measures, such as the nomination of candidates and the granting of final authority on policy, with many offering members substantial voice and others limiting member influence. To ease the comparison of groups on these measures, I used factor analysis to create a scale that captures levels of internal democracy. The seven measures all loaded positively on the first factor, and only the first factor had an eigenvalue exceeding one (2.48), suggesting that this was the dominant underlying factor explaining variation in the measures. Therefore, this factor can be assumed to capture the levels of democratic governance. I scored the first factor to create my measure of internal democracy. This factor score is a standardized measure with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. A group with a score of 1 on the index is one standard deviation above the mean level of internal democracy. A group with a score of 21 is one standard deviation below the mean level of internal democracy. Table 2 ranks each of the groups according to their score on the index. Figure 1 shows the distribution of groups along this index. Nearly half of the organizations (16 groups) are centered within half a standard deviation of the mean (zero). However, there is also substantial variation on this index. In fact, eight women's groups were more than one standard deviation below the mean on the index, and six organizations were more than one standard deviation above the mean.
The group with the highest internal level of democracy is the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW). This group allows its members to nominate and elect officers and board members and to amend bylaws with a majority vote. In addition, members have the final authority on policy. The organization is also comprised of four levels. The democratic governing structure of CLUW may be explained by the organization's labor union origins, as it was formed in the early 1970s during a period of revitalized mobilization around issues of workplace democracy (Cowie 2004; Freeman 2002) . Nevertheless, the other highly democratic organizations also include citizens' groups such as NOW and the League of Women Voters, as well as relatively nonpolitical professional organizations like the IWIRC.
The least internally democratic organization is Women in Government. This national organization offers its members virtually no say in its governance. Members do not vote for or nominate candidates for the board or for officer positions; the board elects its own members and officers. In addition, the board controls the bylaw amendment process and has final authority on organization policy. Women in Government's undemocratic institutions may reflect the professional organization's primary focus on educating women state legislators. However, the least democratic organizations (those more than one standard deviation below the mean) include ethnic organizations such as National Black Women's Health Project and MANA, a national Latina organization, as well as multi-issue organizations like the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), in addition to professional associations. It is important to emphasize that the contrast between organizations scoring high and low on the index is dramatic, further underscoring the point that there is no single approach to the governance of women's organizations. Contrary to expectations, many women's organizations are quite undemocratic, and this is particularly true of most organizations founded since 1960. What explains the variation in governance structures among these organizations? In the following section, I develop and test a model of why groups may choose varying organizational structures. 
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN LEVELS OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY
Several factors may affect how democratic groups structure themselves. For instance, groups of different sizes may choose different governance structures. More populous groups might institute less democratic governance structures in order to manage their heterogeneous membership base and to present a more coherent policy agenda to legislators (see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter [1963] on the potential limitations inherent in managing heterogeneous groups). Larger groups may also be prone to oligarchization (Johnson 1990; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Michels [1915 Michels [ ] 1949 Michels [ , 1958 Piven and Cloward 1978) although more recently scholars have argued that this is by no means an "iron law" (Knoke 1990; Staggenborg 1991) . Christine Day (1999) did find, however, that leaders of smaller organizations were more likely to report consultations with rank-and-file members. Collective action theory predicts that smaller groups are advantaged in retaining members and also provide each member with more influence (Olson 1965) .
On the other hand, larger citizen groups often subdivide themselves into local, state, and national levels, thereby mitigating the large-group problem. Indeed, we might expect groups with more members to be more membership oriented than smaller ones for several reasons. Large, federated organizations may institute enhanced representational processes in order to maintain national-subnational congruence and thus prevent defection (Day 1999) . The very magnitude of large groups suggests that membership recruitment and retention is an organizational priority. In addition, larger organizations are likely to be, by nature, more heterogeneous than smaller ones; they might therefore be structured more democratically in order to ensure that their diverse base is more effectively represented. I collected information on the size of organizations from the Encyclopedia of Associations and from the organizations themselves when necessary.
The financial structure of the organization may also be an important factor affecting the type of governing structure utilized by the group. Specifically, when members are more important to the group's financial stability, the organization is more likely to provide them more voice and influence. Theoretically, groups for whom membership dues comprise a greater percentage of their yearly revenue are more likely to provide significant avenues for member input on organizational policy. Reliance IS THERE A "WOMAN'S WAY" OF GOVERNING? on dues is calculated as a percentage of the group's total reported gross revenue accounted for by membership dues. Greater reliance on dues places a higher premium on leaders' accountability to members in order to prevent their exit. Such accountability is more easily achieved when leaders have a clear sense of their members' preferences (Morris and Staggenborg 2002) . In addition, few membership associations are so well financed that they can forsake the potential contributions of time and energy of the rank and file in pursuing their goals (Rothenberg 1992) . I collected information on the percentage of revenue accounted for by dues from the NCCS data set described previously. 4 The organizations in this sample depend on membership dues to widely varying degrees; the National Black Women's Health Project receives virtually none of its revenue from dues, while the American Association of University Women relies on dues for over 80% of its revenue. The level of financial dependence on members may have significant consequences for how democratically women's groups structure themselves.
When an organization was founded may also affect how democratically it is structured. Staffed with policy experts and focused heavily on national politics, for example, associations founded more recently may be less likely to invest in maintaining ties among the national and local levels of their groups, less likely to involve members in internal politics and policymaking, and more likely to emphasize members' central financial role than groups founded earlier (Godwin 1988; Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Walker 1991) . Indeed, a typical organization's correspondence with its members is now laden with appeals for financial support for the work of the group's lobbyists and the national leadership on the Hill, not with entreaties to attend state or national annual conventions where they might consider changes to the group's agenda (see, for example, the discussion in Shaiko 1999, chap. 3). Theda Skocpol (2003) and Robert Putnam (2000) suggest that these changes became evident after 1960; therefore I include a dummy variable capturing whether an organization was founded before or after 1960. I expect that groups formed after this year will be less democratic than their counterparts.
Finally, some scholars suggest that organizations with feminist goals should theoretically be more committed to democratic governance than other types of women's groups (Hartsock 1983) . The propensity of women to favor more democratic governance structures may have been magnified in recent decades through the influence of the feminist movement. Involving rank-and-file women in decision making was a central concern for many organizations originating with the modern women's movement (Freeman 1973 ; see also Ferree and Martin 1995) . Feminist organizations seek to disperse authority within a group, to share leadership duties, to flatten hierarchical power arrangements, and to seek consensus (Hartsock 1983) . 5 Indeed, even as the newer feminist groups became institutionalized in the decades following their inception, they tended to retain their grassroots focus. For example, Suzanne Staggenborg (1991) found that as the pro-choice movement matured, its organizations also bureaucratized. However, even as movement organizations became fixtures in policymaking, their leadership continued to be concerned with mobilizing and involving rank-and-file participants. Similarly, Maryann Barakso (2004) found that the feminist standard-bearer, the National Organization for Women, retains the strong commitment to participatory governance processes that it first developed during its first decade.
Distinguishing which women's groups are feminist is challenging, particularly because scholars tend to employ widely varying criteria when doing so (see Martin 1990 , for example). As Patricia Yancey Martin (1990, 184) notes, "there is no consensus on the essential qualities of feminist organizations." To generate a measure of whether a group espoused feminist goals, a research assistant and I coded the mission statements of each organization in my sample. I defined feminist goals as Martin (ibid.) does: " [F] eminism is minimally the recognition that women, compared to men, are an oppressed group and that women's problems are a result of discrimination." Thus, whenever a group's mission statement explicitly referenced "equity" or "equality" concerns or "advocacy" on behalf of women, it was coded as feminist. Reflecting the difficulty of this task, the intercoder reliability for this coding was 76%. Any differences in coding were settled after discussion with my research assistant. Ultimately, 25 of 37 organizations were judged to be feminist, revealing that most women's organizations in my sample included at least some attention to feminist goals. 6 5. Nancy Hartsock refers to the understanding of power "as energy and competence rather than dominance" as "the feminist theory of power" (1983, 224) .
6. The Appendix notes which organizations were deemed feminist. In addition to the coding of mission statements, I created two additional measures of whether an organization was feminist. One measure used Feminism: A Reference Handbook as a source for feminist organizations. The second Table 3 presents the results from a regression model in which the democratic governance index was the dependent variable and the independent variables were membership size, the percentage of revenue attributed to dues, and a dummy variable for whether the group was formed before or after 1960. 7 One observation (the National Black Women's Health Project) was excluded from the model because I was unable to attain its membership size after several attempts.
The results presented in Table 3 demonstrate that three of the four variables have a statistically significant effect on how women's organizations are structured. However, the coefficient for the dummy variable capturing whether an organization is feminist fails to attain statistical significance. While many organizations chose to adopt feminist goals, this decision did not appear to make them more or less likely to adopt processes consistent with those goals. This finding may reflect the fact that feminist organizations need to operate in an interest-group system that is now dominated by professionalized associations, which mitigates their ability to adopt consensus-oriented procedures.
The remaining three variables do have a significant effect on internal democracy. First, group size has a significant positive effect on the level of internal democracy. The coefficient for this variable indicates that for every additional one thousand members, a group is .003 standard deviations more democratic. To provide some context, roughly 17 operationalization added to the previous list of groups those that appeared in Carden's (1974) report to the Ford Foundation. I included each measure in the regression model separately and each time the coefficient was small and did not approach statistical significance. Thus, there appeared to be no substantive change in the results regardless of which measure of feminism was included. 7. I also originally included dummy variables for the type of organization (occupational, political/ multi, or ethnic), but the coefficients for these variables failed to attain statistical significance, and excluding them from the model did not affect the coefficients for the other variables.
thousand members separates organizations in the 25th and 75th percentiles of size, and a difference of this many members would only produce a .05 standard deviation movement on the governance index. Indeed, much of this effect appears to be driven by the fact that the very large organizations tend also to be the most democratic. For example, NOW may be considered an outlier in this model because its membership size is much larger than that of any other group and it is also one of the most democratic organizations. When NOW is removed from the analysis, the size of the coefficients do not change, but the coefficient for membership size is no longer statistically significant. Of the six groups reporting more than a hundred thousand members, all are above the mean on the democratic governance index, and four have scores that are more than one standard deviation above the mean. Thus, while the effect of membership size is relatively modest, the exceptionally large organizations in the sample do tend to be the most democratic.
Second, the percentage of an organization's revenue that comes from membership dues also has a significant positive effect on the governance structure of the organization. The coefficient indicates that for every additional 1% of the group's revenue that is accounted for by membership dues, the group is .01 standard deviations more democratic. To provide context for this effect, an organization in the 75th percentile on this measure (receives 40% of its revenue from dues) will be onequarter of a standard deviation more democratic than a group in the 25th percentile (receives 13.9% of its revenue from dues). While the effect is not overwhelming, it does suggest that groups that rely more on their members financially are likely to give those members more voice in the governance of the organization.
Third, the dummy variable for whether the organization was founded before or after 1960 demonstrates that women's organizations formed after this year are nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation less democratic than their pre-1960 counterparts. Figure 2 presents the distribution of women's groups on the governance index based on the year that the organization was founded and underscores the findings from the regression model. The horizontal line depicts the division between women's groups founded before and after 1960. While only 11 organizations in the sample were founded before 1960, all but one of these groups had a score on the governance index that was above zero (the mean). On the other hand, 19 of the 26 organizations founded after 1960 had below-average scores on the index, indicating that the majority of women's groups founded after 1960 were actually less democratic than groups founded earlier.
The distinction between organizations founded before and after 1960 is consistent with Skocpol's (2003) argument about the diminished opportunities for membership influence and participation in contemporary interest groups. I will discuss the consequences of this pattern in the conclusion, but it is important to note that there are several exceptions to the trend presented in Figure 2 . In fact, the three most democratic organizations in this sample-CLUW, NOW, and IWIRC-were all founded after 1960. The inclusive governance structures of both CLUW and NOW reflect the influence of social movements (for union democracy and women's rights, respectively), emphasizing women's empowerment.
In sum, my analysis indicates that women's groups do not provide a single democratic form to their organizations. Rather, the governance structures of these groups vary substantially, depending mostly on the extent to which a group relies on dues and when the group was formed. On the basis of these findings, we would expect members to have more influence in organizations that rely financially on their members and that are older. On the other hand, groups that derive less of their income directly from members and that are newer will offer those members fewer opportunities for representation and participation. In the following section, I discuss the implications of these patterns.
DISCUSSION

Gendered Contexts
Numerous studies of women's leadership behavior suggest that there may be a "woman's way" of governing: Women appear to prefer open, participatory organizational forms. I find, however, that women's preferences regarding organizational structure are not homogeneous when the institutions they create for and by themselves are examined. This finding calls into question the notion that women's leadership styles and preferences, either by nature or socialization, are inherently different from those of men. The findings of a study of more than a hundred national membership organizations, while not directly comparable to this one, supports my finding that women's organizations are not distinguished by especially democratic structures. Barakso and Brian Schaffner (2006) note, for example, that 11.7% of the organizations in their sample did not allow members to vote for the board of directors, compared to 10.8% of women's organizations in my study. Similarly, 35.9% of organizations in Barakso and Schaffner's study allow members to vote for officers, whereas I find that 29.7% of women's groups permit them to do so.
This study supports the notion that gender may operate differently in different contexts (Kanter 1977) . While men and women may exhibit different leadership styles when they work together, these differences are not reflected in the institutions created by women. When women choose their own institutions, not only do they structure them in highly variable ways, but they also appear no more likely to emphasize democratic practices than mixed-gender organizations. How do we reconcile these observations with a substantial body of literature that finds that women in authority are less likely to adopt autocratic leadership styles than are men? The results of this study do not suggest that gender does not matter; rather, men and women bring their expectations of gender roles into the institutional spaces they inhabit. As a result, it is difficult to discern men's and women's leadership styles without explicitly taking this into account. Leaders conform to gendered expectations that their subordinates and superiors have of them (Eagly and Johnson 1990; Gardiner and Tiggemann 1999; Rosenthal 1998 ). Thus, it may be that in mixed-sex workplaces, legislatures, and other organizations, women opt for more participatory leadership styles because they are expected to behave this way, not necessarily because they prefer to do so. Although single-sex environments are by no means free of gendered expectations, women may nevertheless feel at greater liberty to choose decision-making rules that suit the goals and values of their particular organization, rather than conforming to male expectations.
Environmental Factors
It may also be the case that other factors, such as the political and economic environment in which interest groups operate, together with concerns about organizational maintenance, may override any preferences that women may have for more participatory forms of decision making. The exigencies of choosing institutions that best ensure the survival and success of the organization may override gender-based differences in leadership style. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this reality is that despite the theoretical reasons that feminist organizations might be particularly inclined to adopt highly participatory bylaws, I find no evidence that this is the case. Indeed, scholars have found that other types of social movement organizations, which are typically the most invested in the mobilization and activation of members, have adapted to a transformed pressure system that now advantages highly professionalized interest groups (Shaiko 1999) . Like other types of groups, then, women's membership associations offer different structural opportunities for membership participation, depending on the particular circumstances each group faces. Ultimately, women may prefer participatory decision-making apparatuses only to the extent that those procedures do not sacrifice the larger goals of the organizations.
In addition, I find that the structures of newer women's associations parallel the general pattern of diminished levels of democracy that scholars have discovered in membership associations formed in recent decades. Women's associations founded since 1960 have lower levels of internal democracy than those founded earlier. Although the three most democratic organizations in the sample were founded after 1960, the evidence presented here suggests that these groups are outliers: Overall, the governance structures of newer organizations do not consistently reflect a concern for engaging rank-and-file members in organizational life.
Consequences of Undemocratic Structures
What are the consequences of undemocratic governance structures for women? First, if women's groups do not allow their members to participate actively and meaningfully, leaders of those groups may be less cognizant of, and/or less likely to consider, the diversity of women's experiences, opinions, or public policy preferences. In her study of changes in American associational life, Skocpol (2003) , for example, suggests that while the more centralized and professionalized "membership" associations may be well adapted to today's policymaking environment, the public policies they lobby for are more elitist than those championed by the large, diverse, federated, and membershipengaging organizations so much more prominent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 8 Today's less membership-oriented women's organizations, then, may be as effective in pursuing their policy goals as their forebears, but those goals may be less likely to resonate with or reflect the needs of women across class, racial, and ethnic lines. Indeed, this shift seems to be confirmed in the work of Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (2003) , who argues that after the 1970s, women's organizations largely abandoned legislative initiatives, such as child care, that would assist poor women. While beyond the scope of this study, future research analyzing the agendas of women's associations may shed light on how the organizational structures of women's associations influence the representation of women's interests.
Second, if women's diverse interests and needs are in fact underrepresented by newer women's associations, the consequences are magnified when we consider that the interest-group sector also serves as an important vehicle for transmitting civic skills to citizens, equipping them with experiences that facilitate their participation in other areas of public life. Evidence suggests that groups with participatory structures 8. For a more equivocal view of the benefits of federal systems, see, for example, Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht (2003) who note that advocacy organizations have secured rights and benefits in the United States by relying on the centralized power of the national level of government and bypassing local entities resistant to change. However, my analysis demonstrates that federated women's groups are also the most democratic organizations at the national level. Therefore, members have the ability to influence policy in these organizations at both the local and national levels. are especially potent vehicles for enhancing civic participation, knowledge, and skills (Barber 1984; Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Knoke 1981; Voss and Sherman 2000) . Experience with democratic forms of decision making tends to promote citizens' awareness and comprehension of macropolitical processes, as well as their sense of political efficacy (Knoke 1988) . To expand on Skocpol's scenario, then, poor women would be disadvantaged both because the leaders of women's associations are failing to take into account their policy preferences and because poor women are presented with fewer opportunities to learn the civic skills they need to pursue their own interests in other associations or in other policy arenas. Understanding which institutions women choose when they govern themselves matters not only for drawing conclusions about the influence of gender on governance; also it matters because governance in these organizations affect the representation of women's interests more generally. In sum, the failure of most women's organizations to offer members extensive opportunities for involvement in their governance suggests not only that women do not share a particular outlook on organizational form, but also that this failure may also reify established patterns of underrepresentation among different groups of women. The implication is that interest-group governance is important not merely in its own right but because of the types of policy outcomes different institutions are likely to produce.
